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The	pandemic	is	exposing	the	weaknesses	of
populism,	but	also	fuelling	authoritarianism
The	Covid-19	pandemic	may	be	exposing	the	weaknesses	of	populism.	We	should	not	be	complacent,	however,	as
authoritarianism	is	the	real	problem,	warns	Daphne	Halikiopoulou	(University	of	Reading).
Covid-19	has	already	infected	over	700,000	people	worldwide	(at	the	time	of	writing).	Its	exponential	spread	has
placed	national	health	systems	under	severe	strain,	it	has	closed	borders,	and	grounded	airlines.	How	may	we
assess	the	political	implications	of	this	global	crisis,	especially	given	that	it	comes	at	a	time	when	populists	who
thrive	on	the	tensions	between	international	initiatives	and	the	‘national	preference’,	are	in	charge	in	many
countries?
As	political	scientists,	we	often	refrain	from	making	predictions	about	the	future,	especially	in	situations	such	as	this,
which	are	fluid	and	fast-evolving.	What	we	can	do,	however,	is	try	to	identify	likely	outcomes	by	observing	patterns.
For	this,	we	need	comparisons:	by	identifying	differences	and	common	trajectories	we	may	gain	some	insight	into
what	might	happen	under	similar	circumstances.	What	follows	is	a	brief	sketch	of	how	what	we	know,	from
comparing	cases	past	and	present,	can	help	us	understand	the	political	implications	of	the	coronavirus	pandemic,
especially	with	regard	to	populism.
A	brief	look	at	how	different	countries	have	sought	to	address	this	crisis	suggests	that	responding	early	is	key	to
doing	effectively.	For	example,	tracking,	testing,	and	containing	infection	clusters	is	of	paramount	importance.	This
highlights	two	issues.	First,	the	significance	of	state	capacity,	i.e.	the	ability	of	the	state	to	extract	its	resources
efficiently,	implement	policies	effectively,	and	safeguard	the	lives	and	security	of	its	citizens.	Second,	the
importance	of	expertise	–	we	need	epidemiologists,	doctors,	and	medical	staff	to	advise	on	how	the	virus	can	be
contained.
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This	is	all	bad	news	for	populists	who	thrive	on	emotive	but	often	empty	rhetoric.	It	exposes	them,	especially	those
in	power,	and	places	them	under	scrutiny	as	voters	are	increasingly	prioritising	valence	–	i.e.	competence	–	over
emotive	narratives.	This	is	why	it	is	difficult	to	discern	a	specifically	populist	pattern.	With	few	exceptions,	initial
reactions	dismissing	fears	and	downplaying	the	effects	of	the	virus,	have	been	met	with	quick	U-turns.	In	the	UK,
Johnson’s	‘herd	immunity’	strategy	defined	by	a	‘we	can	do	it	alone	and	differently	from	Europe’	attitude	was	quickly
replaced	by	measures	not	dissimilar	to	those	adopted	by	‘non-populist’	European	leaders,	including	school	and
shop	closures	and	full	lockdowns.	Similarly,	while	Donald	Trump’s	pompous	rhetoric	suggests	an	intention	to	re-
open	the	country	by	Easter,	current	measures	are	treating	some	cities	as	epidemiological	‘hot	zones’.	In	Greece,
where	until	recently	politics	was	contested	primarily	on	populist	lines,	the	technocratic	centre-right	government
quickly	closed	schools	and	churches	–	note	that	contradicting	the	Church	is	something	few	Greek	governments
have	been	willing	and	able	to	do.	While	Brazil’s	Jair	Bolsonaro	is	resisting	the	trend,	Sao	Paolo	has	gone	into
lockdown,	and	the	president’s	popularity	is	in	decline.	In	short,	what	these	cases	are	telling	us	is	that	at	least	in	the
short	run,	the	populist	tide	could	be	turning	because	the	provision	of	expert-led	security	is	of	utmost	priority	to
people.
Should	we	be	relieved?	The	short	answer	is	no.	The	coronavirus	pandemic	may	have	highlighted	the	extent	to
which	the	term	‘populism’	itself	is	inflated	and	overused.	But	as	autocratic-minded	leaders	rally	around	the	flag	to
increase	support	at	a	time	of	heightened	insecurity,	the	threats	they	pose	are	real.	Take	down	the	populist	façade,
and	what	we	are	left	with	is	the	traditional	nationalist	and	authoritarian	politics	of	the	kind	that	often	manifests	itself
after	a	crisis.
One	important	lesson	from	the	past	is	that	in	similar	crisis	situations,	leaders	have	taken	advantage	of	emergencies
to	consolidate	power.	The	current	pandemic	is	no	different.	Right-wing	nationalists	in	government,	and	opposition,
have	been	quick	to	blame	immigrants	and	refugees	for	the	spread	of	the	pandemic,	using	them	as	an	excuse	to
attack	freedom	of	movement.	Others	–	for	example	in	Hungary	and	Israel	–	have	used	it	as	an	opportunity	for
power	abuse.	What	should	concern	us	about	many	of	these	actors,	that	we	call	populist,	is	not	actually	their
populism	–	an	ideology	that	draws	on	a	distinction	between	the	good	people	and	the	bad	elites	–	but	rather	their
nationalist,	authoritarian,	and/or	a	far-right	agenda.	Orbán	can	impose	his	undemocratic	measures	not	because	he
is	a	populist,	but	because	he	is	authoritarian.	Marine	Le	Pen	and	Matteo	Salvini	blame	immigrants	for	the	pandemic
not	because	they	are	populists,	but	because	they	are	nationalists.
This	could	result	in	severe	long-term	political	consequences.	In	cases	where	democratic	institutions	are	weak,	there
is	a	serious	risk	of	further	democratic	backsliding.	The	long-term	economic	costs	of	the	crisis	can	only	serve	to
exacerbate	this.	We	already	know	that	wealth	inequalities,	a	decline	of	social	status,	and	limited	access	to
compensation	can	serve	to	drive	voters	closer	to	extremism.
A	very	fine	line	divides	a	strong	paternalistic,	but	effective,	state	that	protects	its	citizens,	from	an	authoritarian	one
that	curtails	their	freedoms.	People	are	willing	to	trade-off	their	liberties	for	collective	security,	but	for	how	long?	The
answer	to	this	question	depends	on	how	successfully	we	can	balance	the	trade-offs	involved,	and	exit	this	crisis
having	simultaneously	protected	our	vulnerable,	and	retained	our	liberal	democratic	values.	This	is	no	easy	task.
While	the	current	pandemic	may	be	unique	in	its	specificities,	it	is	not	unprecedented	in	terms	of	what	it	represents:
an	emergency	situation	that	exposes	systemic	weaknesses	and	threatens	the	stability	of	our	societies.	Lessons
learned	from	parallel	historical	precedents	may	offer	us	the	benefit	of	hindsight.
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